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11 Introduction
Rank-order tournaments have been extensively discussed in labor economics,
sports and other ﬁelds (see, e.g., Lazear and Rosen 1981; Nalebuﬀ and
Stiglitz 1983). In a tournament, agents compete against each other for
given prizes that have been ﬁxed in advance. When choosing their optimal
eﬀorts agents have to trade oﬀ an increased winning probability against a
higher disutility of work. In practice, agents do not only choose eﬀorts but
have also to decide between more or less risky actions.
Previous literature has pointed at two eﬀects when an endogenous choice
of risk is considered: First, it has been claimed that in asymmetric tourna-
ments agents with high abilities will prefer less risky actions to preserve their
favorable positions, whereas agents with low abilities, who have nothing to
lose, will prefer more risky actions to increase the likelihood of winning (e.g.,
Rosen 1988, p. 84, referring to Bronars 1986; Knoeber and Thurman 1994,
p. 158). Second, in symmetric tournaments agents choose riskier strategies
as a higher total variance of the outcome leads to lower equilibrium eﬀorts
and, therefore, lower costs (compare for instance Hvide 2000).
We analyze a simple asymmetric tournament where the agents can de-
termine the risk of their strategy on the ﬁrst stage and their eﬀort level on
the second stage. As a ﬁrst contribution, we show that it is no longer true
in general that equilibrium eﬀorts decrease in total variance. In contrast, if
the ability diﬀerence is large enough, high risk will lead to low eﬀorts: For
high ability diﬀerences a higher risk tends to bring back the less able agent
into the race and therefore raises overall incentives to exert eﬀort which is
of course bad from the agents’ point of view. On the other hand, the above
mentioned “likelihood” eﬀect continues to be of importance. Whereas the
agents’ interests are aligned with respect to reducing equilibrium eﬀort they
2are strongly opposed when the likelihood eﬀect is considered. We study the
interaction of both eﬀects and characterized subgame perfect equilibria of
the game.
2 Model and Results
We consider a two-stage tournament between the two risk neutral agents
A and B. Agent i’s (i = A,B) production function can be described by
yi = ai + ei + εi where ai denotes ability, ei eﬀort and εi an individual
noise term.1 εA and εB are assumed to be stochastically independent with
εi ∼ N(0,σ2
ri). Let ∆ai = ai−aj and ∆a = |∆ai| = |∆aj|. The agents’ cost
functions are c(ei) = c
2e2
i. On the ﬁrst stage, both agents observe the given
abilities and simultaneously choose the risk of their respective production
technologies, ri, with ri ∈ {L,H} and σ2
H > σ2
L. On the second stage, each
agent observes the chosen risks and decides about his eﬀort ei. The two
agents compete for tournament prizes w1 and w2 with w1 > w2 ≥ 0. The
prize spread w1 − w2 is denoted by ∆w. If yi > yj, agent i will receive the
winner prize w1 whereas agent j gets w2 (i,j = A,B; i 6= j).
First we examine the tournament competition on the second stage.2
Proposition 1 A pure strategy equilibrium on the second stage is symmet-


















1Alternatively, we could model heterogeneous agents by using diﬀerent cost functions.
But the additive model has the advantage that we can interpret the ability diﬀerence also
as an agent’s lead in a homogeneous tournament.
2For the existence of pure-strategy equilibria see the discussion in Lazear and Rosen
(1981), p. 845, fn. 2; Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz (1983).
3Here φ(·) denotes the density of a standard normal distribution.
3The eﬀort is strictly increasing in ∆w and strictly decreasing in ∆a and c.
The eﬀort is single peaked in σ2
ri + σ2
rj and highest at σ2
ri + σ2
rj = ∆a2.
Proof. On stage 2, agent i’s objective function is given by ui(ei) =
w2 + ∆w·pr{yi > yj} − c
2e2
i with pr{yi > yj} = G(ei − ej + ∆ai;ri,rj) as
i’s probability of winning where G(·;ri,rj) denotes the cdf of the composed







. Since G(·;ri,rj) is symmetric, we have 1 − G(ei − ej +
∆ai;ri,rj) = G(−ei+ej −∆ai;ri,rj) for agent j’s winning probability. The
ﬁrst-order condition for agent i yields g (ei − ej + ∆ai;ri,rj)∆w = cei with
g(·;ri,rj) = G0(·;ri,rj). Since g(ei−ej+∆ai;ri,rj) = g(−ei+ej−∆ai;ri,rj)
the left-hand sides of both agents’ ﬁrst-order conditions are identical which
implies a symmetric equilibrium with e∗ (ri,rj;∆a) = g (∆a;ri,rj)∆w/c.







T 0 iﬀ σ2
ri + σ2
rj S ∆a2.
Now we can go back to stage 1 and analyze the optimal risk choice by
each agent. The variance aﬀects the agents’ eﬀorts as well as their winning
probabilities. We start by taking a closer look at the ﬁrst aspect.
Lemma 1 For a given technology choice rj of the other player there ex-
ists a threshold level for the ability diﬀerence, ∆ˆ a, so that e∗
i(H,rj;∆a) ≷
e∗































































































































⇔ Ψ(k) := 2k+1kk − (1 + k)(1+k) > 0
which is true as Ψ(1) = 0 and Ψ(k) monotonically increases for k > 1.
Lemma 1 describes the eﬀort eﬀect of risk taking. A riskier technology
will reduce the equilibrium eﬀort of both agents if and only if the ability
diﬀerence ∆a is suﬃciently small. For large values of ∆a a riskier tech-
nology increases the equilibrium eﬀort of both agents. To understand this
result on an intuitive level, suppose that the ability diﬀerence is very large
and the risk of the technologies is low. In that case, the outcome of the
tournament is largely determined by the abilities of both agents. On the
one hand, the more able player knows that he will win the tournament with
a high probability even with low eﬀort. On the other hand, the less able
player can aﬀect his probability of winning only to a small extend. If the
variance of the technologies increases, however, luck may compensate the
ability diﬀerence which then will increase the impact of eﬀort on the out-
come of the tournament. This makes exerting eﬀort more attractive for the
low ability agent. That in turn forces the high ability agent to exert higher
eﬀort levels as well. For small values of ∆a the outcome of the tournament
is less dependent on the abilities of the players but on eﬀort. In such a
situation, choosing a risky strategy decreases the inﬂuence of eﬀort on the
5outcome. As in that way the marginal return of eﬀort for both players is
lowered, they both can commit to exert low eﬀorts by selecting a high risk
strategy.
On a more technical level, as we have seen in Proposition 1 there is
a unique positive value for the total variance (namely ∆a2) at which the
equilibrium eﬀort is maximized. Hence, depending on the values of σ2
H and
σ2
L relative to ∆a either high risk choices or low risk choices by both agents
minimize eﬀort. If ∆a > ∆ˆ a(H) then ∆a will be suﬃciently large relative
to σ2
H and σ2
L. Therefore, eﬀort will be minimized with a low risk choice by
both. On the other hand, if ∆a < ∆ˆ a(L) then ∆a will be suﬃciently small
relative to σ2
H and σ2
L and eﬀort will be minimized with a high risk choice
by both. If ∆ˆ a(L) < ∆a < ∆ˆ a(H), however, the eﬀort is highest if one
player chooses a high risk, the other one a low risk strategy. Total eﬀort is
minimized when either both choose a high risk or a low risk strategy. If only
considering the eﬀort eﬀect, the risk choices by both players are strategic
complements. A coordination problem exists although both agents’ interests
are perfectly aligned.
As we have pointed out above risk taking inﬂuences as well each agent’s
probability of winning. This likelihood eﬀect is characterized by Lemma 2:
Lemma 2 Player i’s probability of winning will decrease (increase) in σ2
ri +
σ2
rj if he is the agent with the higher (lower) ability. If both agents have the
same ability, the winning probability will not be aﬀected by risk.








with Φ(·) as the




H > ˆ σ2















if ∆ai T 0.
The winning probability of the agent with the higher ability decreases
6and that of the agent with the lower ability increases with total variance.
Hence, more able agents will prefer the less risky and less able agents the
more risky technology if they only consider the probability of winning the
tournament. Recall that when only considering the impact of the technology
choice on the eﬀort eﬀect there is no conﬂict of interests between the two
agents. If the ability diﬀerence ∆a is high they both will prefer a low risk,
and when ∆a is low, they both want a high risk. However, when only the
likelihood eﬀect is considered there is a strong conﬂict of interests. The
equilibrium outcome on stage 1 clearly depends on the relative importance
of both eﬀects.
For a given strategy rj player i will prefer a high risk to a low risk if


























































Hence, if there is no diﬀerence in abilities the equilibrium is straighforward:4
Proposition 2 If ∆a = 0 both players always choose the risky strategy, i.e.
(ri,rj) = (H,H).
If both players have diﬀerent abilities, eﬀort and likelihood eﬀect may
work into opposite directions and the total eﬀect clearly depends on the
parameter values. As the left-hand side of inequality (1) is linearly increasing
in ∆w/c, all decisions are dominated by the left-hand side of the inequality
for suﬃciently large values of ∆w/c. The expression in square brackets is
4This result has also been shown in Hvide (2000).
7positive if and only if e∗ (H,rj;∆a) < e∗ (L,rj;∆a). From Lemma 1 we
know that this will be the case if and only if ∆a < ∆ˆ a(rj). We can use
these considerations to ﬁnd all subgame perfect equilibria of the game:
Proposition 3 (i) If ∆a > ∆ˆ a(H) the more able agent will always choose
L, the less able agent will choose L if and only if ∆w/c is larger than a
certain cutoﬀ value. (ii) If 0 < ∆a < ∆ˆ a(L) the less able agent will always
choose H, the more able agent will choose H if and only if ∆w/c is larger
than a certain cutoﬀ value. (iii) If ∆a(L) < ∆a < ∆a(H) there will be an
asymmetric equilibrium in which the more able agent chooses L and the less
able agent chooses H if ∆w/c is suﬃciently small. If ∆w/c is suﬃciently
large there will be two symmetric equilibria in which either both agents choose
H or both L.
Proof. (i) From Lemma 1 we know that L will reduce the eﬀort and
therefore the costs for both agents if ∆a > ∆ˆ a(H) no matter what the other
agent does. From Lemma 2 we know that the winning probability of the
high ability agent is also highest with L. Hence, L is the dominant strategy
of the high ability agent. To see the best reply of the low ability agent
inspect inequality (1). He will choose H if and only if this inequality holds
for rj = L. The right-hand side is negative for the low ability agent. The
left-hand side is negative as well because ∆a > ∆ˆ a(H) > ∆ˆ a(L). Hence,
the inequality will not hold if and only if ∆w/c is larger than a certain value.
(ii) The proof proceeds analogously to (i).
(iii) If ∆w/c is suﬃciently small, the likelihood eﬀect will dominate the
eﬀort eﬀect. The equilibrium then follows from Lemma 2. If ∆w/c is suf-
ﬁciently large the eﬀort eﬀect will dominate the likelihood eﬀect. In that
case, we know from the discussion subsequent to Lemma 1 that there are
8two symmetric equilibria.5
If ∆w/c is large, the costs of eﬀort will be relatively small in comparison
with the winner prize. Hence, both agents will exert a high eﬀort to win the
prize. In that case, the choice of technology is dominated by the concern
to keep the equilibrium eﬀort level as low as possible at the second stage
and only the eﬀort eﬀect matters for the agents’ decisions. As we have seen
in Lemma 1, for small values of ∆a it will be beneﬁcial for both agents to
select high variances to limit the eﬀort exerted, but for high values of ∆a
the contrary is true. For intermediate values of ∆a, however, a coordination
problem exists. If one agent chooses a more (less) risky strategy, the other
one will prefer the same strategy since ri and rj are strategic complements
in that respect.
If ∆w/c is small, the costs of eﬀort will be high relative to the winner
prize. Hence, both will not exert too much eﬀort to win the tournament in
any case. Therefore, risk choice is dominated by the likelihood eﬀect. But
Lemma 2 gives us a clear cut result in that case. The high ability agent will
prefer a low risk to safeguard his position. The low ability agent chooses a
high risk as this helps him to challenge the high ability agent.
3 Conlusion
Our analysis has pointed at two important eﬀects of risk taking in tourna-
ments: On the one hand, it aﬀects the equilibrium eﬀort levels, on the other
hand, the winning probabilities. As we have shown, the impact of risk on
5Explicit cut-oﬀ values for ∆w/c for the three equilibrium types can be computed by
rearranging inequality (1) for the diﬀerent cases. Note that the cut-oﬀ values for the two
symmetric equilibria will diﬀer. If ∆w/c is larger than the highest of both cut-oﬀs, the
two symmetric equilibria will coexist.
9eﬀort levels crucially depends on the diﬀerence in abilities of both partici-
pants. Similar agents’ eﬀorts decrease in risk, but if talents are suﬃciently
diﬀerent the opposite will hold.
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